In two pairs of episodes, first in 1824 and 1846 and then in 1892 and 1935, similar U.S. 
President Monroe. The date of ratification, six months later, came in the first days of Adams's own presidency and Henry Clay's leadership of the State Department. Adams and especially Clay advocated tariff protection for U.S. import-competing goods.
3 How their protectionism related to the treaty is the question to be considered here.
Although Clay was newly installed in his position, his advocacy of a closer commercial relationship between the United States and Spanish America was longstanding. No sooner had peace been restored to Europe with Napoleon's final defeat in 1815 than the victors began a "scramble for the spoils of Bonaparte's empire," as Clay had put it (Annals of Congress 1818:
1494). Collectively, the kingdoms of Great Britain and Europe maneuvered to stifle the republican aspirations of Spanish America. Individually, they sought to win control for themselves -or, failing that, to block transfer of the provinces' sovereignty to anyone else.
From the beginning of the Spanish American struggle for independence, its leaders looked to the United States as the exemplar of New-World republicanism and received popular sympathy in return (Rivas 1915: 7-8, 14-15) . Clay, then Speaker of the U.S. House, had proposed that the United States should grant the new republics not only sympathy but also recognition. Political recognition would be given practical effect by stronger commercial ties (Clay [1818] 1843: 90-93).
Promoting a republican hemisphere by moral suasion and commercial ties was a central pillar of Clay's "American system" (Campbell 1967) . It was consistent with President Monroe's famous message of 1823, which held the circumstances of U.S. relations within the hemisphere to be "eminently and conspicuously different" from those outside of it. 4 In Clay's view, and likewise in John Quincy Adams's, the pillar of U.S. hemispheric stewardship and the betterremembered one of tariff protection were mutually reinforcing. 5 The U.S.-Colombia treaty of 1824 was the outgrowth of that view.
To be sure, in promoting hemispheric solidarity Clay had began with moral not commercial arguments. Spanish America, he declaimed to Congress in March, 1818, was 3 On Clay's protectionism ca. 1824, see Stanwood (1903, v. 1: 200-224) . On Adams's, which is not a subject of such clear and lengthy public record, see Taussig (1892: 74) . 4 American State Papers: Foreign Relations, vol. 5, no. 360, 18 th Cong., 1 st Sess. (2 Dec. 1823): 250. 5 Bemis ([1949] 1973: 362) describes how Adams's view of the United States' role in the hemisphere, which had long been more limited than Clay's, had broadened by 1823: by then "the opposing Latin American policies of Adams and Clay had approached each other" to the point that "all difference had melted away on the issue." subject to a "stupendous system of colonial despotism" (Annals of Congress 1818: 1477) entailing both violent repression and commercial restriction. Not even the United States had suffered such tyranny before braking from its master. Spanish America was an abused and neglected relation who asked merely for recognition from her republican kin; the U.S. was obliged to offer it.
But soon he came to practical considerations. Great Britain and Spain had barred access to the ports of the West Indies and Spanish America to all but the ships of the mother countries, and had governed their agriculture so as to serve imperial rather than colonial interests. Such was the system of the Old World. In contradistinction, the system of the New was identified not only with republican forms of government but also with dissolution of the fetters to international navigation and the establishment of laws serving the needs of each country. The benefits for the United States of the Spanish-American provinces' adoption of such a system -which, two years later, he would call explicitly the "American system" (Annals of Congress 1820: 2228) -were manifest. Although for the moment the U.S. produced few products of importance to them, nevertheless, once their ports were opened without discrimination, the advantage in shipping would lie with the burgeoning U.S. merchant marine. "Our navigation will be benefitted by the transportation," said Clay, "and our country will realize the mercantile profits" (Annals of Congress 1818: 1486).
Opponents, Clay acknowledged, would object that the benefits to mercantile interests would be offset by Spanish America's rivalry to U.S. agricultural interests. The objection was "narrow, and selfish, and grovelling," he declared (Annals of Congress 1818: 1486). But he deigned to answer it. The Americas offered the United States precious metals, cocoa, coffee, sugar, and assorted other articles -of which, by Clay's calculations, less than two percent, consisting mainly of cotton, competed with U.S. products (ibid.: 1484-1486; see also Table 1 ).
And while agriculture would not lose in the bargain, manufactures would gain. U.S. manufacturing exports were already "respectable" and were "constantly augmenting"; their destinations were mainly within the Americas (ibid.: 1485).
[ INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] The treaty of 1824 with Colombia (then "Gran" Colombia, encompassing Venezuela and Ecuador as well as New Granada) was designed to give the legal framework to promote those results. The treaty's centerpiece was Article II, which stipulated the most-favored-nation (MFN) principle. Because the principle would later be embodied differently in U.S. commercial treaties, its embodiment in Article II bears quoting. The U.S. and Colombia promised reciprocally "not to grant any particular favor to other nations, in respect to commerce and navigation, which shall not immediately become common to the other party, who shall enjoy the same freely if the concession was freely made, or on allowing the same compensation if the concession was conditional (Malloy 1910, vol. 1: 293) .
For present purposes three observations should be made about the MFN principle as written above. First, it inscribed non-discrimination into the commercial relations of the U.S.
and Colombia, but only in the limited sense of each country's eschewal of discrimination against its treaty partner vis-à-vis all other countries. Each country reserved the right to discriminate against its treaty partner in favor of itself. That is to say, MFN did not imply national treatment of the partner's commercial agents or ships -nor of the partner's goods, as free trade would require. Second, therefore, although the MFN clause was compatible with more liberal commerce between the U.S. and Colombia, the extent to which it promoted that end was bound to depend on circumstances outside of the clause itself. The circumstances include most importantly how much each country's general tariff and maritime policies discriminate against the most-favored nation, and the likelihood that each country's future tariff concessions to other partners will indeed be extended to the original treaty partner as the MFN principle would seem to demand.
Third, the MFN principle as written in Article II did not, in fact, even demand that each country's future tariff concessions to others should be extended to the original partner. The conditional clause at the end of the article appears to make room for such extensions; in practice it made them unlikely. With conditional MFN, favors granted afterward to another nation by treaty could always be construed as having been made only on condition of all other articles in the treaty. The favors would have to be made extensive to the original treaty partner, therefore, only on condition of the partner's assent to a complete set of identical articles. A country's treaties with its several partners differed in a sufficient number of articles, and in sufficient detail, that such an event could scarcely ever happen.
Understanding this implication of the conditional clause, U.S. Secretaries of State ensured that it appeared in almost all of the country's MFN treaties from independence through the end of the 19 th century. What was more, in those relatively few MFN treaties in which the clause was absent, U.S. authorities insisted nonetheless on a conditional interpretation -and did so with such consistency that conditionality of MFN came to be known as the "American" view (Herod 1901: 13) . The ablest exponent of the view was none other than John Quincy Adams (ibid.: 12-13). His motive, consistent with his protectionist inclinations, was not to make reciprocal commitments that might result in general reductions of tariffs on U.S. imports and thus expand simultaneously the field for the principal U.S. exports (which comprised mainly agricultural goods, provisions, and lumber). 6 It was to pursue other objectives while keeping U.S.
merchandise tariffs high -and even increasing them, as Congress did with the protectionist tariff of 1824, which Adams was understood to favor (Stanwood 1903, v.1: 241 ; see also Table 2 ).
[ INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] Those other objectives, besides the diplomatic ones, were the promotion of U.S.
manufactures and (even more) navigation. The benefits of a treaty, Adams told Richard C.
Anderson, his chargé d'affaires in Bogotá, lay in Americans' prospects as "carriers to and for
[Colombia] of numerous Articles of Manufactures, and of foreign produce" (Adams to Anderson, 27 May 1823: 298) . 7 In order to improve the prospects he sought, first, an end to Colombia's rebate of between 5% and 7.5% on the ad valorem duties levied on goods imported directly from Europe (including Great Britain) -a rebate that was not applied to goods imported 6 For the year ending 30 Sept., 1825 (the first in which data for U.S. exports to Colombia were reported separately from those to other former Spanish South American colonies), approximately $54 million of the $67 million of total exports of U.S. products to all destinations were agricultural (including $37 million of cotton and $4.5 million of wheat, flour, and biscuit), $4 million were lumber and other basic wood products, and $3 million were manufactures -of which $790,000 were soap and tallow candles and $720,000 were leather, boots, shoes, and saddlery. Exports of U.S. products to Colombia were but $1.1 million or 2% of the total. Of that value, $217,000 consisted of flour, $140,000 soap and tallow candles, $97,000 of pork, hams & bacon, lard, and hogs, $57,000 of tallow, hides, horned cattle, $42,000 of furniture, and $40,000 of boots and leather shoes. Exports of foreign products from the U.S. to Colombia were approximately the same value as exports of U.S. products to that country, but the products were largely fabrics, including $240,000 of cotton goods and $207 Recognition by Great Britain was widely held to be the greatest prize (Rippy 1929: 192 , 1801-1906, v. 9) . But he deemed it prudent, given political circumstances of the moment in the United States, to exclude consideration of national treatment during negotiations with Colombia (ibid.: 294). Even if Adams's qualified appreciation of national treatment were accepted as part of his policy, the point would remain that the liberality of the policy pertained in effect to navigation and not trade in goods. 13 The average tariff is defined here as the ratio of total customs duties to the value of either dutiable imports or total imports. The data are taken from U.S. Bureau of the Census (1975) , series U207, U208, U210.
The Treaty of 1846
The reason for the 1824 treaty's failure to fulfill completely the hopes of its U.S. authors was the same as that of its considerable success. It was the leeway for both parties to adopt policies that were neither expressly entertained nor plainly proscribed by the treaty's text but were surely at odds with its spirit. Colombia's government happened to be adept at using that leeway.
Colombian trade policy at the time discriminated among foreign suppliers of goods and services, as well as between foreign and domestic suppliers, in multiple dimensions. Take Colombia for President Andrew Jackson, saw the impediment that the duty entailed for the U.S.
carrying trade as "almost constituting a complete prohibition" (quoted by Rivas 1915: 76) . The legal basis of the duty has been a matter of perplexity for almost two centuries. Thomas P.
Moore, who succeeded Harrison from 1829 to 1833, professed his inability "to ascertain whether this practice is founded on law, on arbitrary usage, or on the caprice or cupidity of the collectors"
(Moore to Minister of Foreign Relations, 4 Nov. 1831); the Colombian ministers of whom he inquired could do no better (ibid.; also Minister of Foreign Affairs to Moore, 9 and 14 Nov.
1831). 15 The likeliest basis was the construal by Colombian officials of their country's tariff law, which specified levies upon "goods, imported in foreign vessels that proceed … from Europe or the United States" (Ley de 13 de Marzo, 1826), to imply not only that the goods as well as the vessels should "proceed" from Europe or the United States, but also that they should do so in the sense of their being produced within either place, and, what was more, in the sense of their being produced within the particular place between them whence the vessel arrived.
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Of all the more-or-less reasonable ways of construing the law, this would arguably have been on 15 The correspondence from and to Moore may be found in House Doc. No. 46, 22d Cong., 1 st Sess. (10 Jan. 1832): 4, 5, 9. Historians have shared Moore's perplexity without admitting (or perhaps apprehending) it. Parks (1935: 170) cites Rivas (1915: 76) as locating the legal basis of the additional 5% in a decree of May 8, 1829. But the citation, which is repeated by Huck (1991: 220) , is mistaken: Rivas refers to an extra duty of 5% on all goods imported in foreign vessels, not on goods of different nationality than that of the ship carrying them (see the text of the decree in Carillo Batalla [1986, Tomo II: 407-412] , including particularly Article no. 12). Díaz-Callejas (1997: 169-171) , too, finds the cause of the U.S. complaint about "discriminatory duties" in the decree of May 8, 1829. In his case the mistake is to imply that the U.S. complaint was fundamentally about lack of national treatment. Ospina (1955) , in his otherwise detailed history of Colombian tariff policy, acknowledges that the equal treatment of the U.S. and Great Britain inscribed in Colombian law was "more apparent than real" (115), but does not specify the legal basis of the extra 5% duty at issue. He implies that Colombian tariff law granted equal treatment to goods proceeding directly from Europe or the United States only "under the same conditions" (ibid.) -including, presumably, the condition of the goods' nationality being the same as the ship's. But neither the tariff law of August 5, 1823, which he cites, nor that of March 13, 1826, which superseded it, contains such language. See Codificación Nacional (op. cit.: 262-264) and Carrillo Batalla (1986: Tomo II, 13-22 State, 1801 -1906 ; second, that it would require further explanation of why it was more important for U.S. ships than for European ships to make a stop in colonial ports before proceeding to Colombia. the lesser end of the spectrum. It would surely have been the least obvious; the most advantageous to Great Britain, whose vessels could be laden wholly with British exports; and the most injurious to the United States, whose vessels, for lack of variety in U.S. manufactures, were laden with mixed cargoes of U.S. flour and manufactures together with re-exported British, French, and other goods (Moore to Secretary of State Edward Livingston, 21 Nov. 1831).
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During the political turmoil of the early 1830s, as Ecuador and Venezuela separated from New Granada (here to be called Colombia, the name readopted by the diminished country in 1863), Minister Moore's diplomacy was successful in eliminating temporarily the discriminatory 5% duty. The occasion was his arguing that the United States was due equal treatment with Central America, with whom Colombia had entered into a treaty in 1825 guaranteeing reciprocal national treatment for all cargoes, domestic or foreign, so long as they arrived in the partner's vessels by direct navigation (U.S. House Doc. 46, 22d Cong., 1 st Sess.: 6-8). 19 The Colombian government accepted the argument on condition of receiving the same favor the United States.
Moore communicated his government's reciprocation of it, and it was duly granted by executive decree on November 21, 1831 (ibid.: 10-11). The decree satisfied U.S. wishes, and more: the complaint about effective discrimination against the United States vis-à-vis Europe, particularly Great Britain, was addressed by abolishing the discrimination against the United States vis-à-vis
Colombia, at least in direct navigation.
To the dismay of U.S. officials, the Ministry of Finance decided that the decree was unauthorized and brought about its repeal after only one year of operation. 19 The treaty may be found in Uribe (1920: 38-42 Secretary Forsyth explained, MFN as provided by Article 2 of the treaty of 1824 proved "in practice to be uncertain and illusory": so it could be "with the best intentions on both sides," and so it surely would be "with a desire to disregard the spirit of the article by either" (Forsyth to State (1820 State ( -1906 States lost official favor (Parks 1935: 198-200 The official interests of the United States and Colombia at last coming into alignment, the treaty proposed by Mallarino was signed on December 12, 1846 (Malloy 1910: 302-314) . The
United States obtained the abolition of discrimination by way of national treatment in navigation (Article IV). National treatment for re-exportation from each country in vessels of the other was also explicitly allowed. But these provisions were no longer ends in themselves: now they 24 See Blackford's dispatch to Secretary of State John C. Calhoun, 26 July 1844, and the enclosed statement of the Colombian Minister of Foreign Affairs on British incursions on the Mosquito coast, in Manning (1935: 608-618) . 25 The instructions may be found in Manning (1935: 601) . 26 In Manning (1935: 630-631). amounted to an assurance that no other power would win exclusive privileges in trans-Isthmian commerce. The assurance was elaborated in Article XXXV, which also contained the crucial U.S. guarantee of "the perfect neutrality" of the Isthmus. The guarantee required the United
States to use its power "positively and efficaciously" to prevent any interruption of the free passage of goods and people over the territory -and, "in consequence," to maintain Colombia's sovereignty over it. In later years Colombians would see the guarantee as having precisely the opposite consequence (Diaz-Callejas 1997) . For the moment, however, the guarantee met resistance not mainly in Colombia but rather in the United States, where it awakened old apprehensions of "entangling alliances" (Parks 1935: 208-209 ).
Yet there were even greater apprehensions about the treaty than those stirred up by Article XXXV. When at last the treaty was ratified by the U.S. Senate on June 3, 1848, a full year and a half after its signing, only four of the twenty-nine senators voting in favor were from the Whig Party, which counted Adams and Clay among its elder statesman. Of those four, none was from farther north than Pennsylvania. Of the seven voting against, six were Whigs and one a Free Soiler, none from farther south than New Jersey. The Morrill Tariff of 1861, together with three more acts through 1865, raised duties steeply. In 1848, total customs duties were 23% of the value of merchandise imports and 26% of dutiable merchandise imports. By 1866 the figures were 42% and 48%. 28 The duties garnered revenue for prosecuting the war; they also stimulated the United States' nascent and importcompeting manufacturing industry. 29 The protective doctrine of the time articulated rationales, and sought legislative means, for cementing the gains to manufacturing and promoting their growth. Doing so involved, in two distinct senses, a diversion.
First, duties on food staples and raw materials could be reduced so as to divert the political will for comprehensive tariff reductions. As the moderate protectionist (and then Congressman) James A. Garfield put it in 1870, without a "reasonable reduction" of tariffs the backlash against them would "soon seriously shatter our whole protective system" (Cong. Globe, 41 st Cong., 2 nd sess., appendix: 272). So the Tariff Act of 1870 added unmanufactured lumber, "india" rubber, rags for paper-making, and cinchona bark quinine-making to the free list, and reduced substantially the tariffs on other items. Free rubber and cinchona were a boon to Colombia, but it was the other reductions that mattered more, especially coffee. Then coffee was added to the free list two years later, and likewise cocoa, so as to give consumers a "free breakfast table" (Tarbell 1912: 63, 78-79) . Hides were added as well, as were bananas in 1883.
Thus was established by the end of the 1880s a seemingly paradoxical state of affairs. By assent of protectionist legislators, and without the Colombian government having to offer a single concession, every single one of the top 5 U.S. imports from Colombia entered duty-free.
Second, protectionists embraced the use of reciprocal-trade deals to divert Latin American imports of manufactures from Great Britain and Europe to the United States. For most protectionists the embrace entailed an awkward shift of policy and doctrine. The reciprocity deals that were needed were not the old most-favored-nation kind. They were a new kind that garnered positive discrimination in favor of the United States, and granted it reciprocally to the partner, by stipulating preferential duties that each party would levy on the other's products. A treaty to that effect had been tried with Canada in 1854 and protectionists had widely condemned it. In the 1870s protectionists began to see things differently, at least where tropical countries were concerned. Such countries, according to protectionist apostle Henry C. Carey (1876: 8) ,
28 See Carter et al. (2006: Ee429-430) . 29 The proportion of the labor force engaged in manufacturing went up by more than a third, to 19%, between 1860 and 1870 (Carter et al. 2006: Ba815-Ba816, Ba821 30 As quoted in Meardon (2011b: 329) . See also Crapol (1973: 53-55) . 31 Crapol (1973: 126) and Pletcher (1962: 179) alike refer to negotiations with Great Britain, El Salvador and Colombia, as well as the other countries named. But among all those countries, El Salvador and Colombia do not appear in Wiktor's (1976 Wiktor's ( -1994 The obstacles to reciprocity in the 1870s and '80s were pregnant with lessons.
Protectionists had already seen the futility of using commercial treaties to divert goods trade unless the treaties stipulated preferential tariffs, not just MFN treatment. Now they saw the difficulty of getting such treaties through the U.S. House of Representatives as well as the Senate. And they saw the unlikelihood of negotiating significant concessions, even from relatively weak partners, when the reciprocal concessions wanted by the partners were inscribed from the get-go in the U.S. tariff schedule. If reciprocity was to be undertaken for protectionist ends, then it had to be undertaken differently.
By the turn of the 1890s, Secretary of State James G. Blaine's plan to achieve those ends was to forego treaties altogether. Better to avoid their "delay and uncertainty" and vest power in the President to declare U.S. ports free to the entry of goods from partner countries that did the same for U.S. foodstuffs, lumber, metals, machinery, and other products (Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 158, 51 st Cong., 1 st sess.: 6). Thus was conceived section 3, the "reciprocal trade provisions," of the Tariff Act of 1890. Although coffee, tea, and hides would remain on the free list (and sugar and molasses added to it), the President was authorized to levy an alternative schedule of higher duties on those products, so long as they originated from any country whose treatment of U.S.
products was, in his judgment, "reciprocally unjust and unreasonable" (26 U.S. Stat: 612).
The authorization was effective January 1, 1892. Some countries hastened to head off an adverse judgment before that date: by the end of 1891, Blaine had extracted agreements for the modification of the tariff laws of Santo Domingo, Cuba, Puerto Rico, El Salvador, and to wield the stick effectively they sometimes did it menacingly (Meardon 2011a ) . 34 Under the Underwood Tariff the ratio of total duties to the value of total imports, and of duties to dutiable imports, had fallen considerably, to 9% and 29%. The protectionist Fordney-McCumber Act of 1922 raised them to 15% and 36% (Carter et al. 2006: Ee429-Ee430) . Imported straw hats, which had become Colombia's fourth largest export to the U.S., saw a 10 percentage-point increase in their ad valorem duty, to 35% (Tables 1 and 2 ). But tariff increase for straw hats was the exception. (Mecham 1961: 113-114) . There, to its Latin American partners, the United States formally pledged adherence to the rule that "states are juridically equal" and "enjoy the same rights"; that each state had "equal capacity" to exercise its rights, no matter the "power which it possesses" to ensure their exercise (ibid: 115, emphasis added).
As it applied to military intervention, the pledge was significant. It was less so as applied to trade policy, where it did not address the matter at hand so much as imagine it gone. The conventioneers had conjured a "capacity" that made "power" irrelevant. This was fantasy. It could not be denied that each state had the right to arrange its trade policy as it saw fit. But neither could it be expected that the U.S. would arrange its policy without concern for its own advantages, nor could it be disputed that the trade of the U.S. was less important to itself than to its partners. In the latter fact lay power, and in the former the reality that the United States would use it.
It could be reasonably expected that the United States would not wield its power In the first year of FDR's presidency the context was an abundance of uncertainty about even the general direction of U.S. trade policy, let alone its application. Hull was a committed free trader whose thinking on the subject hearkened back to the Democratic party of his youth in the 1880s and 90s (Allen 1953) . The President's closest advisers -the "Brains Trust" centered originally around Columbia University law professor Raymond Moley -were more inclined toward "putting first things first," subordinating international trade to domestic recovery.
Roosevelt fingered Moley to be Assistant Secretary of State even as he promised Hull, as
Secretary, a free hand (Steward 1975: 13-16; Butler 1998: 15-22) . What it all signaled for U.S.
trade policy was hard to know.
Hull envisioned a diplomatic initiative for worldwide tariff cuts. What he got from President Roosevelt was consent to negotiate several reciprocity treaties that would be submitted to Congress by the usual process. Hull acquiesced and started with Colombia.
The "great interest" that Colombian President Enrique Olaya Herrera was reported to have in the project cooled when the United States' aims were clarified. State Department cables to the U.S. chargé in Bogotá inquired about "reductions which Colombia is prepared to accord to American products in return for leading Colombian products remaining on the free list" (U.S.
Dept. of State, Foreign Relations 1933: 219) . By this time, "leading Colombian products" meant coffee, which constituted no less than three-quarters of U.S. imports from that country (Table   1) . 35 But coffee had now entered duty free for half a century (Table 2) . Once again, the United
States was playing for tariff concessions in return for a guarantee of the status quo. What had changed was mainly that the stakes were higher than ever for Colombia, whose exports had come to be remarkably concentrated in a single commodity.
To President Olaya it seemed a hard bargain (U.S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations 1933: 227) . Likewise to the Colombian press, including editorialists at the leading bogotano newspaper, El Tiempo. 36 Nevertheless they accepted their lot. As one editorialist put it, "Colombia could hardly feel disinclined to negotiate with the nation that, among other things, buys four-fifths of her coffee" (El Tiempo, 9 Dec. 1933: 4) . 35 The other Colombian products enumerated in the treaty were: bananas, balata, platinum, emeralds, ipecac root, raw reptile skins, tagua nuts, and tamarinds (Unsigned State Dept. memo, "Memorandum: Colombia," 28 June 1934, p. 6. FDR Papers, OF 313, Box 1). 36 See issues of El Tiempo dated 28 Nov., 30 Nov., 1 Dec., 3 Dec., 5 Dec., and 7 Dec., 1933.
The treaty's text was not released while ratification was pending. But it was known to include a list of a handful of products imported by the United States from Colombia, most importantly coffee, that would be declared exempt from all import duties, excise taxes, or prohibitions; and a list of about 150 products imported by Colombia from the United States, mainly industrial but some agricultural (including the foregoing and especially sensitive hoglard), upon which duties would be either reduced or bound at current rates. There were reciprocal unconditional-MFN commitments for all products, listed or unlisted. The conventional historical view of the RTAA sees it as "a new institutional foundation" for trade policymaking that eventually cleared a path for the U.S. and the world toward postwar trade liberalization (Schnietz 2000, p. 417) .
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This essay will argue that the conventional view of the RTAA overstates its importance.
In any case, though, its enactment threw up a barrier to the Colombia treaty. Thereafter, the easier way to enact the treaty's provisions would be to reframe them as an agreement under the RTAA. To do so would occasion some degree of renegotiation, which, depending on the degree, saw "skyscraping trade obstructions that bristle on every economic frontier," evidence of economic illiberalism that had "almost become a disease" (U.S. Senate 1934: 5) . While Hull's remedy for the disease was to quit exposure to the toxin, Peek's was more in the way of an antibody. To him, inspection of the nation's balance sheets for international transactions revealed export surpluses that happened to be unpromising for the promotion of exports. The surpluses were financed by net U.S. capital outflows that were "compelled" by widespread exchange controls. Exporters faced political impediments to receiving hard currency payments 38 See also Butler (1998 ), Zeiler (1999 ), and Irwin, Mavroidis, and Sykes (2008 . Hiscox's (1999) view, which complicates the conventional one, is more consistent with the account in this essay. 39 The necessity of modifying the treaty so that it would conform to the requirements of agreements under the RTAA was spelled out by the legal adviser to the State Department in a memorandum of May 26. See Gellman (1966: 67, note 41 Come June, Peek found a more appealing pitch for his program, now more apple pie than antibody. "Yankee trading," he called it in another radio address. The sensible way "through the maze of restrictions and barriers which now impede our trade" was simply to practice "the old Yankee method of bartering -goods for goods, equal value given and received, a fair bargain on both sides" (Peek 1934: 2) .
In order to understand Hull's eventual triumph and how it affected U.S. was quite another way to construe it. The act's stipulation that any changes in U.S. duties inscribed in trade agreements would "apply … to all foreign countries" has already been noted.
But there was a qualification. The act also stipulated that the President could suspend any such changes as they applied to countries undertaking "discriminatory treatment of American commerce" or "other acts or policies" which he perceived as working against the act's purposes Hull's formal reply to Peek's report justified the President's decision by trumpeting first principles. Although Peek was right to worry about the proliferation of exclusive agreements, "the remedy lies not in withdrawing into a conditional policy, but in increasing the number and widening the scope of our reciprocal unconditional obligations." The United States should not respond with exclusive agreements of its own, for, "being generally discriminatory, they provoke retaliation, and, in the end, diminish rather than increase the sum total of world trade." The Roosevelt administration's economic program, "instead of pursuing this narrow and destructive trade policy, points in the opposite direction." As it must do, for "if some country does not thus take the lead another economic collapse … will be almost certain" (Hull to Roosevelt, 18 Aug.
1935, FDR Papers, OF 971, Box 2).
The foregoing blasts signaled Cordell Hull's real triumph. The word is apt for his accomplishment, whether or not one approves of it: a significant redirection of U.S. trade policy, against firm opposition, toward an end he had sought for most of his political career. The argument here is that the RTAA was utterly insufficient for the triumph. It may not even have been necessary. The triumph was owing to Hull himself and the free-trade doctrine animating the RTAA under his leadership. The institution could very well have been, and nearly was, animated by a doctrine of protection and retaliation. After all, its main provisions, which comprised executive authority, a carrot of dubious appeal, and a stick of possible menace, resembled the reciprocity provisions of the protectionist McKinley Act. In both instances the gist was congressional pre-approval of tariff reductions that were neither far reaching nor far below the existing U.S. tariff schedule for the goods mainly at issue, and possible penalties for 42 Butler (1998, ch. 5) partners who declined to deal. And the same carrot and stick, albeit without the same executive authority, were held out in the decade before FDR's administration by the Republican ones of Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover.
To be sure, the result of Hull's triumph was not free trade. It was the modest expansion of U.S. trade for a short while during the interwar years, without much resort to threats of retaliation and without validating the worst apprehensions of bad faith. The U.S.-Colombia trade agreement was signed on September 13, 1935 in nearly the same form that was agreed to two years before (U.S. Dept. of State, EAS 89). That was progress in light of the record of the preceding half century.
Conclusion
In one contribution to the growing literature on institutions and economic development, Ha-Joon
Chang (2010) suggests that institutions are neither as determinative nor as constraining as they are imagined in theory. In order to understand how they do function, "our [institutional] theories need to be more richly informed by real-world experiences -both history and modern-day events" (Chang 2010: 23) . This essay follows the suggestion into the domain of trade policy, particularly bilateral trade deals. The history of U.S.-Colombia trade agreements from the 1820s to the 1930s gives insight into how the institutions of trade agreements affect their orientation toward free trade, protectionism, or something else.
The insight is that the influence of political institutions on the actual orientation of trade policy is less decisive than is commonly imagined. In the history told here, economic doctrines and the interests they promote have been more decisive, bending institutions to one end or another depending on which doctrine or interests hold sway. The conditional MFN treaty between the U.S. and Colombia of 1824 was consistent with protectionism, by John Quincy Adams's lights, and by Henry Clay's it fostered that end. But by 1846 a similar U.S.-Colombia treaty was opposed by Adams's and Clay's Whig Party, and even by Adams and Clay themselves. The problem was not that protectionist Whigs came around to disapprove of the form of the treaty but that predominantly free-trade Democrats took it up and invested it with a new purpose. The purpose happened not to be free trade but the expansion of U.S. territory, which most free traders saw as a kindred cause, and thereby the domain of slavery. 
